This article examines one of the most frequently used statements in Iran’s post-revolutionary political and social discourse, namely the claim that *“the government is not responsible for dragging people to heaven by force.”* The paper first explains the legal and jurisprudential meaning of this expression. After distinguishing between the government’s **general** and **particular** functions, and presenting two foundations for determining these functions—the **social contract** model and the **definition of an Islamic government**—the study concludes that the implementation of Islamic legal rulings by an Islamic state is, in principle, among its particular and exclusive functions.
However, moving from religious propositions to enforceable state laws requires passing through two stages: first, **ascertaining the existence of a mandatory Shar‘i ruling**, and second, **ascertaining the requirements for transforming that ruling into statutory law**. It is evident that rulings that the Lawgiver has not made obligatory for individuals cannot be imposed by anyone else, including the government, as primary religious obligations.
Each of these two stages has its own conditions, without which a religious proposition cannot legitimately become a binding legal rule. Among these conditions are: establishing that the Lawgiver, *as* Lawgiver, has addressed the issue; verifying that the proposition qualifies as a **“standard fatwa”** (i.e., an authoritative jurisprudential ruling); ensuring the existence of both the soft and hard infrastructures necessary for proper implementation; public acceptance of the law; and the society’s capacity to bear the consequences of violating it.